

After EU enlargement in May 2004, an entirely new migration space started to open up at its eastern borders, to add to the considerable back and forth East-West movement which already existed. This means, for example, that some of the 400,000 Ukrainians who have crossed into Poland are already finding themselves positions in private households in Warsaw. New EU members could soon be overwhelmed by insecure or failing neighbouring states, unless a rather more inclusive EU comes to their rescue with a new, burden-sharing, migration regime. Meanwhile, people-trafficking – a 13 billion dollar industry per annum – is now the second largest source of revenue after drugs on the balance sheet of global organised crime. Last but not least, post-9/11, protecting your own people against foreigners has emerged as the acid test for good governance.

Speakers at the conference were duly congratulated for shifting the historically and politically charged preoccupation with the ‘single act’ of border-crossing into a vocabulary of flow management – which would enable a fresh look at the broader systematicities within which mass migration plays itself out. Such a shift of focus could begin to develop the processes and institutions which could be deployed as so many bridges between the increasingly diversified states in the world today: it might help to replace regimes based on false oppositions with systems more closely attuned to the messy reality in which countries are simultaneously senders, receivers and transit routes for migrants. The idea of circulating people and profits might be reintroduced into the discussion. Governments might think of bringing together what have hitherto been discrete approaches to international trade, human rights, public protection, social cohesion. In short, as Saskia Sassen has put it succinctly, such discussion would be a starting point for beginning to ‘re-map the fear’ and to ‘institutionalise the in-between’.

This mood changed abruptly when a young expert from the British Home Office Strategic Policy Team took the podium. Not surprisingly, he opened with a set of reassurances. ‘Don’t be too pessimistic about what governments can do,’ he urged. Britain had shown how, viewed rationally as a question of outcomes, targeted incentives and disincentives, once you decide what you want – ‘you want the economic outcome, but not the social or security downside’ – this is perfectly achievable. ‘We’ve halved asylum figures, as we said we would, in nine months, and related crime is down by a quarter’, he announced, with a clear sense of achievement. Given that the name of the game was being seen to ‘manage migration’, such a focus on targets was unsurprising, though worse than misleading.

The policy approach he was outlining was quite the reverse of ‘re-mapping the fear’. A list of migration-related security threats in no particular order issued from the overhead projector – unsafe neighbourhoods, terrorists in hiding, criminal

In the first part of this article I discuss the notion of human security and how it has developed since the early 1990s when it became part of public political discourse. In the second part I examine the two sides of the asylum seeking paradox and link them to the current securitisation of migration – generally, but especially in relation to the United Kingdom and the EU. In conclusion I relate the debates on human security and asylum to Giorgio Agamben's² notion of 'bare life' and to the notion of multi-layered citizenship.³

'Human security'

'Human security' is a buzzword that developed during the post-cold era as part of a search for a more inclusive and/or alternative discourse to that of 'human rights'. It is an ambivalent, vague and heavily contested term, as it tends to be used in different ways by different social and political agents. Some would question the legitimacy and/or usefulness of the term altogether.

The military construction of the notion of human security was originally associated with the UN's 1992 'agenda for peace' (A/47/277-S/24111). There 'human security' is associated with the growing move of military security concerns in the 1990s, after the end of the cold war, from inter-state to intra-state wars and from national territories to ethnicised and racialised communities, in local and trans-national conflict.

However, the agenda of 'human security' as it developed has also been much more radical and encompassing than solely its military and policing agenda, partly pushed by the growing participation of NGOs in various UN forums and the growing sophistication of Peace and Conflict Studies. The discourse on human security that emerged out of these concerns also reflected the growing unease not only with the spread of ethnic conflicts and wars but also with the growing poverty and inequity under a neo-liberal globalised market. It shifted the attention from state and territorial security into people's daily lives and experiences. As the 1994 UNDP report stated, 'human security' was 'articulating a preventative "people-centred" approach that focused jointly on "freedom from fear and freedom from want"'.⁴ Or, to use Kofi Annan's more detailed declaration: "human security" can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratisation, disarmament and respect for human rights and the rule of law'.⁵

Sadako Ogata, the co-chair of the Commission on Human Security and a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 1991 to 2000, argues that:

Human security seeks to build upon and combine insights from various other perspectives. In addition to examining the state security perspective, we were able to

turn to examine this, as well as the particular effects it has had on the lives of refugees and asylum seekers, we need to examine more closely the notion of security itself. The notion of security has occupied a central political, as well as theoretical, role in the modern nation-state. Some formulations of modern society as 'risk society', such as that of Ulrich Beck, have put security as the first priority of government.¹¹ Indeed, because of neo-liberal globalisation and the weakening or privatisation of so many facets of the welfare state, this priority starts to gain almost an exclusive nature. 'Security is a universal good available to all, and a solemn pledge between citizens and their political leaders to whom their people's security is "the first duty", the overriding goal of domestic and international policy makers'.¹²

However, this elevation of security to 'first duty' is not without its pitfalls. Anthony Burke discusses two *aporias* (destructive impasses) of security: 'firstly ... a growing sense that security no longer has a stable referent object, nor names a common set of needs, means or ways of being, and secondly ... the moral relativism that lies at the centre of dominant (realist) discourses of security that pretend to universality but insist that "our" security always rests on the insecurity and suffering of an-other'.¹³

We shall return to and discuss, later in the article, issues relating to the second 'aporia'. In relation to the first, one probably can see the project of 'human security' as part of the changing 'referent object' of security – the social and political demand to view security as something that lies not just beyond military state security but beyond any militarised construction at all. This is not necessarily an impasse. On the contrary, feminists and other human rights activists who have become attached to the project of 'human security' have attempted to subvert the notion of 'security' and transform it into a project of resistance that aims to incorporate social and economic, if not cultural, rights into the civil and political rights hegemonic discourse of human rights. They see the discourse of 'human rights' as too captivated by the civil and political rights that dominated it during the cold war, as well as too concerned with individual rather than collective rights.

Human security seems, as Sadako Ogata points out in the quotation above, a useful complementary strategy to bring these issues into the international political agenda.

However, the use of the term 'security' in order to promote this project, because of its highly legitimate and authoritative role in international relations, has caused some to reject the validity of the project as a whole: 'rather than seek to rescue security, to make it conform to a new humanist ideal – however laudable – we need to challenge security as a claim to truth, to set its "meaning" aside ... [we need] to see security not as an essential value but as a *political technology*'.¹⁴ And Sonia Alvarez feels that promoting the project of 'human security' would

actually started years before the events of 9/11. It has been closely related to the shifting roles of the military and other security forces in the post cold war period. As Tim Dunn and José Palafox explain:

the militarisation of the US-Mexico border has occurred chiefly as a result of Washington's 'War on Drugs' ... The militarisation process has been largely driven by political grandstanding – politicians trying to look tough in the war on drugs – and institutional opportunism – police agencies taking advantage of congressional largesse for this 'war effort' and national security agencies reinventing themselves in order to compete for budgetary resources in the post-cold war era.³⁵

I would argue that, in addition to the war on international crime such as drugs, plus institutional opportunism of state security agencies, one has to view this process in the context of the diminishing state under neo-liberalism, when the policing function of the state becomes almost the only one that still has full legitimacy. However, under Donald Rumsfeld, as has come out in the war against Iraq, even this military function, including interrogation of political prisoners, has not escaped partial privatisation.

It is clear, though, that 9/11 has given what many governments have seen as a legitimate reason formally to change their civil and human rights legislation in general, and those pertaining to migrants and asylum seekers in particular. 'National security' has become the mantra with which to justify these developments. Typically, in the United States, immigration functions have become included in the brief of the new Department of Home Security. At the same time, US security departments and border police have extended their powers outside US territory and have started to check people's immigration status in many of their ports of exit as well as arrival. And as US borders have become militarised, especially with Mexico but also with Canada, they have in addition become to a certain extent deterritorialised, enabling some people (or 'humans') and blocking others from entering the country. This security approach that focuses on constructing boundaries between those who belong inside the state's territory and those who do not is a completely different kind of 'human security' approach to that imagined by the development and NGO activists. Other governments, such as the UK and other EU countries, have developed similar policies of securitisation.

It is not, though, just a question of the number of states who adopt such an approach to migrants and asylum seekers. Thouez points out that, while in 1985 only one inter-state cooperation procedure was in place, today there are at least eleven regional consultative processes in operation, and there also has been a new development of global guidelines by 'experts from government and non-government sectors', such as those who published in 2002 'the Declaration of the Hague on the

future of refugee and migration policy'.³⁶ A central plank of such policy, specifically encouraged by the IOM (International Organisation of Migration – an interstate organisation of member states established during the Cold War, which, according to CARF³⁷ is unaccountable to national parliaments³⁸), is to encourage a 'voluntary' repatriation of refugees and asylum seekers to their countries of origin. Among the countries that were declared, until a couple of months ago, to be safe for such repatriation from the UK were Iraq and Afghanistan.

The securitisation approach has devastating effects on asylum seekers. The working article No 38 of the UNHCR, written by John Morrison and Beth Crosland, that discusses European policies in this area concludes that:

much of existing policy-making is part of the problem (of increasing human trafficking and smuggling) and not the solution. Refugees are now forced to use illegal means if they want to access Europe at all. The direction of current policy risks not so much solving the problem of trafficking but rather ending the right of asylum in Europe, one of the most fundamental of human rights.³⁹

Indeed, as Arun Kundnani demonstrates, the claim by the British government that numbers of asylum applications have fallen by roughly half during 2003 (from 22,030 to 11,955) because of a 'rooting out' of a greater number of bogus claims is clearly false.⁴⁰ If it were true, then the percentage of asylum requests accepted as genuine, or warranting exceptional leave to remain, would have gone up during this period. Instead, it actually came down from thirty-three per cent to twelve per cent. And the reasons for this reduction have nothing to do with the genuineness of the claims but are due to the growing strictness of Home Office decision-making procedures and categories. These procedures include stronger border controls, new visa regimes for certain countries and the introduction of a 'white list' of supposed 'safe countries', as well as the withdrawal of benefits for families who refuse to be 'voluntarily' resettled in their countries of origin.

As Jef Huysmans points out: 'In Western Europe – but also elsewhere – we have recently witnessed an offensive of security language in the societal and internal affairs sectors. The multiple references in political and academic debates to a new security construction that relates terrorism, drugs, immigration and asylum, has generated a new agenda in security studies'.⁴¹ Huysmans describes this new framework and claims that securitisation: 'involves three elements':

First, it requires practices enunciating security, of mobilising security knowledge in a particular political context. Second, these practices, if successfully performed, articulate a configuration that integrates problems, definitions, institutional processes and expectations under a security umbrella ... Third, securitisation requires a constellation of rules, or a logic, that organise practices as security practices.'

Notes

1. I would like to thank Kristen Timothy and Jonathan Rutherford for reading and commenting on the first draft of the paper.
2. Giorgio Agamben, 'We Refugees', (www.egs.edu/faculty/agamben/agamben-we-refugees.html), 1997.
3. See, for example, Ch. 4 of my book *Gender and Nation*, Sage, 1997 and my paper 'The Multi-Layered Citizen at the Age of "Globalisation"', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, no. 1, Summer 1999.
4. Sabina Alkire, 'Working Definition' and 'Executive Summary' from *Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, (www.humansecurity-chs.org/doc/frame.pdf), 2002, p4.
5. UN *Millenium Report*, 2000, pp43-44.
6. Sadako Ogata, 'The Human Security Commission's Strategy', *Peace Review*, Vol.16, 1, pp25-28, 2004.
7. Kristen Timothy, 'Human Security Discourse at the UN', *Peace Review*, Vol.16,1, pp19-24, 2004.
8. Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famine*, Clarence Press, 1981; Amartya Sen, *Inequality Re-examined*, Clarence Press, 1992 ; Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds), *The Quality of Life*, Oxford University press, 1993; Martha Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
9. Amartya Sen, 'Why "human security"?' Presentation at the *International Symposium on 'human security'*, hosted by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online at www.humansecurity-chs.org/doc/sen2000.pdf.
10. Linda Basch, 'Human Security, Globalisation and Feminist Visions', *Peace Review*, Vol.16,1, pp5-12, 2004.
11. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Sage Publications, 1992 (1986).
12. Anthony Burke, 'Aporias of Security', *Alternatives* 27, pp1-27, 2002, p1.
13. Ibid, p.2.
14. Op cit.
15. Sonia Alvarez in a panel discussion on human security, AWID conference, Guadalajara, November 2002.
16. In the debate on the issue that took place at the final session of the seminar on human security, gender and globalisation, in CUNY, May 2004. See note 17.
17. The seminar took place on a bi-weekly basis during academic years 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. It was organised by the National Council of Research on Women (President Linda Basch, Senior Research Fellow Kristen Timothy) and the Women's and Gender Studies Centre at the Graduate School of City University of New York (Director Prof. Patricia Clough) as part of their Rockefeller-funded research programme on the subject. I had the good fortune to be one of their Research Fellows (with Ewa Charkiewicz) during the last semester of the Programme and would like to thank the organisers and the participants for their many insightful contributions as well as their supportive feedback to my own work.
18. Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century*, Georgetown University Press, 2003, pp311-312.
19. Such as that of B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde Jaap (1998), *Security: A new framework for analysis*, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp23-24.
20. An international network of women from the South (DAWN= Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era).
21. Op cit.
22. Colleen Thouez, 'Migration and human security', article submitted by the International

- Migration Policy Programme for the *Consultation on International Migration* (organised by UNFPA, UNITAR, IOM and ILO, Berlin 21-22 October 2002).
23. Randy Lippert, 'Governing refugees: the relevance of governmentality to understanding the international refugee regime', *Alternatives* 24, 1999, p3.
 24. www.UNHCR.ch, 2002.
 25. Editorial in *Refugees*, vol 4, no.3 2003, p3.
 26. Op cit, p5.
 27. Frank Duvell, 'The Globalisation of Migration', *Open Democracy*, December 2003.
 28. 30 May 2002, quoted in Thouez, op cit.
 29. Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, Princeton University Press, 2001.
 30. Ibid, p. ix.
 31. Op cit.
 32. Op cit, p.309.
 33. Information given to me by one of the members of the Commission.
 34. Didier Bigo, 'Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives*, 27, pp63-92, 2002, p63.
 35. Tim Dunn and José Palafox, 'Border Militarisation and Beyond: The Widening War on Drugs', *Border Lines*, vol.8, no.4, April 2000, pp14-16.
 36. Op cit, p10.
 37. CARF = Campaign Against Racism and Fascism, a campaigning body affiliated to the Institute for Race Relations in London.
 38. CARF editorial, 'The IOM and the Culture of Expulsion', *CARF68*, Autumn 2002, pp9-10.
 39. John Morrison and Beth Crosland, 'The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: The Endgame of European Asylum Policy?' (independent expert report/UNHCR working article no.38) July 2001, p1 (www.newleftreview.net/NLR26101.shtml).
 40. Arun Kundnani, 'Analysis: the quarterly asylum statistics' in www.irr.org.uk/2-3/december/ak000002.html, 2002.
 41. Jef Huysmans, 'Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security', *Alternatives*, 27, 2002, pp41-62.
 42. Op.cit, p65.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Op cit.
 45. Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity*, Polity Press, 1991.
 46. Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society, Culture*, 3 vols, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996-8; see also Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, Sage Publications, 1997, ch.3 and 4; and 'Belonging: from the Indigene to the Diasporic', in Umut Ozkirimli (ed.), *Nationalism and its Futures*, Macmillan, 2003, pp.127-144.
 47. Don Flynn, *Tough as old boots? Asylum, immigration and the paradox of New Labour policy*, JCWI discussion article, November 2003.
 48. Ibid, p1.
 49. *Guardian*, 17/2/2004.
 50. *Guardian*, 23/2/04.
 51. Op cit, p2.
 52. Zygmunt Bauman, *Wasted Lives*, Polity Press, 2004.
 53. In an article also called 'We refugees' that was published in *The Menorah Journal* in 1943.
 54. Op cit, p2.
 55. E.g. Yuval-Davis, op cit 1997, 1999, 2003.
 56. T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge University Press, 1950; *Social Policy in the Twentieth Century*, Hutchinson, 1975.

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42. US Bureau of Justice Assistance, February 2001.
43. M. Va Lor, 'How Many Immigrants Must You Imprison to Turn a Profit', *The Witness Magazine*, A Globe of Witnesses, www.thewitness.org/agw/mayvalor080802.html.
44. PPRI No.44, op cit.
45. Va Lor, op cit.
46. T. Nguyen, 'Detained or Disappeared', *Colorlines*, www.arc.org/C_Lines/CLArchive/story5_2_03.html.
47. 'Prison Service Barred from Jail Contract', *The Observer*, 31.10.99.
48. PPRI No. 38, op cit.
49. PPRI No. 49.
50. Corporatewatch, op cit.

who is seeking asylum – and from what?

found rather than staying where there is none) are openly condemned – by governments that try hard to make ‘flexible labour’ the prime virtue of their electorate, and exhort their native unemployed ‘to get on their bikes’ to where the labour buyers are. But the ‘suspicious’ motive of economic gain is also imputed to newcomers who not so long ago would have seen as exercising their human right to seek shelter from discrimination and persecution. Through repeated association, the term ‘asylum seeker’ has acquired a derogatory flavour. Statesmen of the European Union deploy most of their time and brain capacity in designing ever more sophisticated ways of plumbing and fortifying borders, and the most expedient procedures for getting rid of the bread-and-shelter seekers who have nevertheless managed to cross the borders.

David Blunkett, not to be outdone, proposed blackmailing the countries of refugees’ origin into taking back ‘disqualified asylum seekers’ by cutting financial aid to the countries that refused to do so.¹³ This was not his only new idea. Blunkett was keen to force the pace of change across the board, complaining that a lack of verve among other European leaders was making progress too slow. He supported the creation of an all-European ‘rapid joint operations force’, and ‘a taskforce of national experts’ to ‘draw up common risk assessments identifying weak points in the EU ... external borders, addressing the issue of sea-borne illegal migration and tackling human trafficking’ [the new term designed to replace the once noble concept of ‘passage’ – Z.B.]

With the active co-operation of governments and other public figures who find in the aiding and abetting of popular prejudices the sole available substitute for confronting the genuine sources of existential uncertainty haunting their electors, ‘asylum seekers’ have replaced the evil-eyed witches, ghosts of unrepentant evil-doers and other malignant spooks and hobgoblins of urban legends. The new urban folklore, in its recycling of the transmitted lore of hair-raising horror stories for which the insecurities of city life have always generated an avid demand, assigns to the victims of planetary out-casting the role of principal ill-intentioned actors. As Martin Bright has suggested, attacks on asylum seekers are ‘becoming the norm in the UK’. In Plymouth, for instance, such attacks have become routine.¹⁴ Thus he describes Sonam, a 23-year-old farmer from Nepal, who had been in Plymouth for only eight months, and had two missing teeth – lost ‘not in the violent conflicts in his own country, but coming back from the corner shop in Davenport’.

Hostility from the natives, combined with the refusal of state benefits to newcomers who fail to claim asylum upon arrival, the trimming down of ‘humanitarian protection’, and the tough deportation policy aimed at ‘unwanted’ refugees (10,740 deported in 2002, 1300 detained pending their deportation in June 2003), has resulted in a sharp drop in asylum applications. The figures were triumphantly interpreted by David Blunkett as evidence of the

Republic are the postmodern serfs, providing the low-wage factories where clothes, electronics and cars are produced for 20-25% of the cost to make them in Western Europe'. Inside fortress continents, 'a new social hierarchy' has been put in place in an attempt to square the circle: to find a balance between blatantly contradictory, yet equally vital postulates – airtight borders but also easy access to cheap, undemanding, docile labour, ready to accept and do whatever is on offer; or free trade but also a pandering to anti-immigrant sentiments (that straw to which governments in charge of the sinking sovereignty of nation-states are clutching). 'How do you stay open to business and closed to people?' asks Klein. And answers: 'Easy. First you expand the perimeter. Then you lock down.'

The funds which the European Union transferred most willingly and with least haggling to the East- and Central-European countries applying for accession were those earmarked for the fortification of their Eastern borders ...

Perhaps these simultaneous moves are related manifestations of the current well-nigh obsessive concern with security; perhaps they can be explained by a shift in the balance between perpetually present inclusivist and exclusionary tendencies; or perhaps they are mutually unrelated phenomena, each subject to its own logic. It can be shown however that, whatever their immediate causes, these trends derive from the same root: *the global spread of the modern way of life, which by now has reached the furthest limits of the planet*, cancelling the division between 'centre' and 'periphery', or, more correctly, between 'modern' (or 'developed') and 'pre-modern' (or 'underdeveloped' or 'backward') forms of life – a division that has accompanied the greater part of modern history, during most of which time the modern overhaul of received ways was confined to a relatively narrow, though constantly expanding sector of the globe. As long as it remained relatively narrow, that sector could use the resulting power differential as a safety valve protecting it from overheating, and the rest of the planet as a dumping site for the toxic waste of its own continuous modernisation.

The planet, however, is now full; that means, among other things, that typically modern processes like order-building and economic progress are taking place everywhere, and so everywhere 'human waste' is being produced and turned out in ever rising volume – this time, however, in the absence of 'natural' refuse tips suitable for its storage and potential recycling. The process first anticipated by Rosa Luxemburg a century ago (though described by her in mainly economic, rather than explicitly social terms) has reached its ultimate limit.

Notes

1. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild, Routledge 1961, pp387, 416.
2. At the time of the Gulf War, 'when Saddam turned his helicopter gunships on the Iraqi Kurds, they tried to flee north over the mountains into Turkey – but the Turks refused

Past issues

Mediactive bridges the gap between universities and public debate, engaging with contemporary issues of politics and culture; it uses theoretical concepts, but tries to be free of jargon – aiming at a general non-fiction readership as well as an academic market. The principle idea is the fast and effective publication of good quality writing and scholarly work, and the use of modern technologies to reduce costs to a minimum.

Issue 1 Knowledge/Culture (2003)

Mediactive 1 looks at the revolutionary changes being made in the provision of public forms of education in the UK, largely instituted by policies informed by neoliberalism. The changes to practices of knowledge creation and academic life are paradigmatic, and we need to understand these new conditions, and to create a language and politics which can reassert the value of knowledge and education as public goods. The issue includes: an analysis of the nature of knowledge; discussion on New Labour and the knowledge economy, cultural studies as an area of contestation, the commodification of education and news journalism; new thoughts on science and culture; and a rethinking of intellectual work in the digital age. **Contributors** Clare Birchall, Lynda Dyson, Alan Finlayson, Andrew Goffey, Gary Hall, Glenn Rikowski, Jonathan Rutherford.

Issue 2 Celebrity, edited by Jo Littler (2004)

Mediactive 2 investigates the world of celebrity. From the talented to the simply over exposed, celebrities feed the media machine with a display of wealth, scandal and glamour, fuelling our fascination with the imitate details of other people's lives, loves and foibles. The issue includes a discussion on reality tv; an analysis of the Blair family's celebrity status; a debate about intimacy and 'keeping it real'; a look at cult tv fan cultures; and a discussion about popstars trying (and usually failing) to be actors. **Contributors** Anita Biressi, Kay Dickinson, Jeremy Gilbert, Matt Hills, Jo Littler, Heather Nunn, Oscar Reyes.

Issue 3 Mediawar, edited by Anita Biressi and Heather Nunn (autumn 2004)

Issue 3 examines the media's portrayal of the Iraq war, and the media management that has become a central component of the military's war. *Mediawar* analyses the ways in which issues of interpretation, meaning and representation in the coverage of war have become a constant site of political struggle. The issue includes discussion of: war reportage as entertainment; political activism and alternative war news; children and war coverage; the gendered representation of women at war; embedded journalists; media