

The Trial of Fatima: Anarchists, Muslims and the *Monde Libertaire*, 2003-05

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Fatima was the prophet Mohammed's daughter. In colonial Morocco, her name was used by French householders as a generic term for a female servant, in colonial Algeria it served to indicate a prostitute. Today, the same girl lives in France, and she is making the headlines. Recently she has appeared at two trials: it is the second of these which will be the subject of this article.

The first trial took place in late 2003 and early 2004, when Fatima was the subject of two major parliamentary enquiries, the first presided over by Jean-Louis Debré and second by Bernard Stasi. The stated brief of these bodies was to discuss the presence of religious symbols in public life but, as almost every French paper and commentator noted, their real subject was the presence of a few hundred veiled schoolgirls in French state schools. This is not a new issue: it first attracted public debate in the late 1980s. The Debré and Stasi committees produced two reports which, put together, were over a thousand pages long. These were then followed by 21 hours of parliamentary debate in February 2004, involving some 120 speakers. The final result of these deliberations was to change one word in the regulations governing the appearance of pupils in schools: prior to September 2004, school pupils were not allowed to show *ostentatoire* symbols of religious allegiance, after that date all *ostensible* symbols were banned. The difference between the two terms is hard to capture, even in French, but the first word could be translated as approximately equivalent to ostentatious, the second as noticeable or public.¹ The exact significance of this law is still being debated: while Sikh turbans and Jewish yarmulke are definitely banned, it is left to teachers and headteachers to decide whether a particular crucifix is *ostensible* or discreet. Even in the case of the veil, the law remains unclear. 'If I let my veil fall over my shoulders, they ban me', explained one schoolgirl to me, 'if I tie it behind my neck, and tell them it's a bandanna, they let me in.'

Polls indicated that the majority of French public opinion, and even the majority of French Muslim public opinion, were clearly in favour of this measure, but one qualification needs to be made to this point: debates were bitter and divisive. Many of France's most prestigious civil liberties and human rights organizations were critical of this legislation, and some elements within the teachers' trade unions opposed it. While the Greens were the only national party to refuse to support the legislation, it was an issue which split long-standing friends and allies. Even the libertarian left was divided. While, as will be seen, the *Monde Libertaire* mainly produced arguments solidly in favour of the law, other libertarian sources – such as the new web-site *lmsi* – were far more critical.²

Before moving onto our main subject, one brief word of explanation is needed concerning terminology. Amongst supporters of the legislation, the word *voile* (veil) was fairly consistently used to identify the *ostensible* symbol to which they objected. Among opponents, a wider range of terms was used: *hijab*, *foulard* (headscarf) as well as *voile*. In many ways, *foulard* is probably the most accurate of these terms: these schoolgirls usually wore relatively loose bits of cloth that they draped over their heads. They did not follow Taliban-style strictness. If I was writing an anthropological essay concerning the schoolgirls' cultures, I would probably choose *foulard* as the most suitable word. However, as this paper principally concerns outsiders' perceptions, I will stick to the more commonly circulating term 'veil'.

THE *MONDE LIBERTAIRE*

So much for Fatima's first trial. Her second trial, which will form the main subject of this paper, took place in the columns of the *Monde Libertaire* (henceforth ML).

The ML began publishing in October 1954, as the voice of a newly reconstituted Fédération Anarchiste, but its origins can be traced back to *Le Libertaire* created by Sébastien Faure in December 1894. It is a weekly, which ceases publication for three months every summer. ML probably has a circulation of about ten thousand, making it arguably Europe's most widely read anarchist periodical. About five years ago it shifted from a largely black and white broadsheet format to its current, more colourful, twenty-four page tabloid format. At the same time, there was a shift from relatively long analytic articles to shorter, more polemical pieces. The ML remains the official voice of the Fédération Anarchiste (FA), a federation of several different currents of anarchist activism and critique. There are approximately eighty local groups within the FA, which also owns a well-equipped meeting-room and bookshop in Paris, and runs the prestigious Paris-based Radio libertaire.

Just as the FA is a federation, so the ML is not a rigidly-run mechanism for hammering out an agreed line. Indeed, there is a curious similarity between the structures of debates within the FA and those within Islamic culture: there is usually no acknowledged leader, but a series of experts who offer contrasting interpretations of a set of accepted principles, relying on their experience, their charisma or the force with which they argue to gain acceptance. (The formal hierarchy of Shi'a Islam in Iran, and its close involvement with state structures is atypical of Islam as a whole.) In practice, one finds that there are key issues on which the ML feels certain, and expects agreement from its readers (such as solidarity with workers' protests) and other issues on which disagreement and even confusion are usually acknowledged in a fairly mature and responsible manner. Often contributions appear from writers who are not FA members. One could cite the debates around the 2005 Euro-Constitution refer-

endum as an example of the second approach: the ML published articles suggesting acceptance, rejection and abstention. Such a variety of opinions may well be appropriate. In areas where one sets neither the agenda nor the question, yes *and* no can sometimes be a proper response. Put simply, the main purpose of this paper is to suggest that the ML placed its discussions of the veil in the wrong category: its editors assumed that this was an area in which all ML-readers would agree, when it would have been more responsible to encourage debate and a plurality of opinions.

While writing this paper, it struck me how strange it was that one could now debate the ML *and* Islam, and that this issue had arisen in relation to the veil. Of course, no French paper has been able to ignore Muslim politics in recent years. The first issues of ML were published in the mid-1950s, during the Algerian War of Independence. The ML played a prominent part in publicizing the use of torture by the French army in Algeria, and also campaigned against the sending of conscripts to Algeria. But the FA always refused to support either the nationalist-revolutionary FLN (National Liberation Front) or the more Muslim MNA (Algerian National Movement), arguing that the war in Algeria was merely a battle between two bourgeoisies, French and Algerian, and that the proper anarchist attitude should be one of neutrality.³ In more recent decades, discussions concerning Islam or French Muslims were relatively rare in the ML – until the war of the veil in 2003-04. This is rather curious: France has the largest Muslim population in Europe. Experts consider that between four to six million Muslims live in France: approximately one-tenth of France's population of 58 million. Nearly every estimate comes with the qualification that only about half of these are *practising* Muslims, but this point raises more questions about the status of the others. In many French towns, Muslim-Arabs, usually from North Africa, form a sub-proletariat: they are the street cleaners, the manual workers and the hotel maids. One of the few good cartoons raised by the topic of the veil came in the satirical weekly, the *Canard Enchaîné*. It showed an Arab construction worker, sweating over a heavy pneumatic drill, and grumbling 'And what about this drill? Does it constitute an *ostensible* sign of religious affiliation?' In a sense, ML is in a privileged position: with its circulation, its resources and its contacts, it has a unique opportunity to study, to analyse and to debate the re-constitution of a social hierarchy in a post-colonial country during globalization, and to develop a distinctively libertarian intervention on these important issues. The evidence of its coverage of the veil suggests that it has singularly failed to do this, and it is for this reason that it is worth considering this matter in more detail.

For this article, I have re-read twelve articles from May 2003 to October 2005, which – bearing in mind ML's three month summer holiday – amounts to one article every two months on average. Obviously, this is not an enormous corpus of material, but the arguments presented in these twelve articles are revealing. Without exception, they concern Islam in relation to French schools,

to schoolgirls and to *laïcité*, the ideal of a secular public sphere. Significantly, the second and the fifth of these articles, which are probably the most hard-hitting of the twelve, are written by feminists in groups outside the FA. The widespread use of pseudonyms makes it difficult to identify the articles' authors with certainty, but three of the twelve papers seem to have been written by women, and none of them appear to have been written by authors with an Arab or Muslim name.

Only one of these articles is clearly against the proposed law of March 2004. A second article argues strongly against a dogmatic defence of *laïcité*, and a third suggests a type of neutrality on the issue. However, there can be no doubt about the MLs 'centre of gravity': the clear majority (nine) of the articles were clearly against the wearing of *le voile* in state schools. As the one anti-law article pointed out: there is a contradiction here. Anarchists pride themselves on their anti-authoritarian values. Why was France's leading anarchist weekly supporting the state's stigmatisation of a minority population?

During the course of 2003, the ML was presented with a new issue. Its contributors – many of them reasonably experienced political militants, some of them practised writers, none of them experts on Muslim culture – approached it awkwardly. Looking at these articles as a whole, it is clear that their first aim was to confirm an existing body of anarchist theory rather than to re-consider and to investigate – and one can hear the political gears crunching and screeching as they do so. Perhaps the most revealing line in all these articles is a single phrase concerning the writings by women in Bangladesh and Iran: they 'confirm what we know'.⁴

LAÏCITÉ

While these articles can be seen as being 'about Islam', this is not how the debate was presented to ML readers. Instead, the war of the veil was interpreted, firstly, as a debate for or against *laïcité*. Most ML contributors are deeply attached to this value. There is some reason for this: *laïcité* is a concept which has been developed, generation by generation, across over two centuries of French history. Often its progress is marked by clashes and crises: one could cite the now infamous Calas case of 1762-65, when the Enlightenment philosopher Voltaire rose to the defence of Jean Calas, a Protestant who suffered judicial torture and then execution after the false accusation that he had killed his own son to prevent his conversion to Catholicism. More relevant might be the Dreyfus Affair of 1895-1906, when a Jewish French army officer was wrongly accused of spying for Germany, and was sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil's Island. Anarchists were initially slow to respond. Bakunin and – more particularly – Proudhon had made some use of anti-semitic imagery in their writings, and there was an easy, sloppy assumption circulated among many anarchists that all Jews were rich bankers like Rothschild. It took

a courageous minority of militants, headed by Sébastien Faure and Octave Mirbeau, to alert libertarians to the dangers of their toleration of anti-semitism. Mirbeau was particularly eloquent: he appealed for working-class support for Dreyfus.

When injustice strikes a living being – even if he's your enemy – you get hit as well. By injustice, Humanity's split into two. You must heal it, ceaselessly, by your efforts and, if you're rebuffed, do it by force, if necessary. In defending him, who's been oppressed by every brutal force, by all the passions of a declining society, you're defending yourself in him, you're defending your people.⁵

From such cases there developed the ideal of a religiously neutral public sphere, open to all citizens, and free of prejudice and domination by any church or institution. For much of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, this ideal was enthusiastically supported by the labour movement, and secular schoolteachers often became socialist or communist militants. Among anarchists, a particularly militant strand of anti-clericalism developed, directed against the Church's influence in schooling and its frequent support for right-wing political causes.

An opinion poll showing that 65% of the French population supported the ideal of *laïcité* was therefore celebrated by ML: it demonstrated 'a most pleasing lucidity'. This was a simple, either/or choice. 'Either you believe in emancipation or you believe in submission', noted the author.⁶ In another article on the hyper-provocative *Manifesto des indigènes de la République* [Manifesto of the Natives in the Republic] of April 2005, one contributor responded that this text should be rejected by ML readers as it was not an (acceptable) condemnation of colonialism but an (unacceptable) attack on *laïcité*.⁷ One article alone made the necessary corrective: in practice, French *laïcité* has been largely created by authoritarian state action; it is based on an abstract ideal of the model citizen, stripped of all signs of personal identity, and who thus accepts the nation-state as the centre of their political universe.⁸

Like President Chirac himself, the writers for ML believed that their values of *laïcité* were being attacked by outsiders intent on destruction. ML drew back from spelling out the logical consequence of such attitudes – i.e. explicit support for the new law. In fact, this was even occasionally denied, but it remained the obvious lesson to be drawn by MLs readers.

THE VEIL

Like Chirac, Debré and Stasi, the ML spoke with great certainty about the meaning of the *voile*.

- ‘The veil is a sign that the patriarchy that one believed was exhausted, has been revived in its most retrograde and virulent form: radical Islam.’⁹
- ‘The veil is the symbol of a seclusion of women.’¹⁰
- ‘[The veil is] a direct attack on women, it is their negation.’¹¹
- ‘[Choosing to wear a veil is] of course, the freedom to choose voluntary servitude.’¹²

There is an assumption of intellectual and political superiority in these phrases. Anybody who has studied this issue would concede that the *voile* is polysemic: it carries multiple meanings; it is context-sensitive. In Iran in the 1980s and in Afghanistan in the 1990s the actions taken by authoritarian Muslim groups to enforce the compulsory wearing of the veil are clear examples of a blatant disregard of women’s autonomy. But to reduce the range of meanings of this millennia-old costume to these instances is absurd, and the insistence by these largely male, largely white, entirely non-Muslim commentators that they understand *the* meaning of the veil better than women who wear it really is an act of colossal political arrogance – surpassed only by Chirac’s, Debré’s and Stasi’s pronouncements. None of the ML’s writers make any effort to discuss the matter with any schoolchildren – let alone with the girls who wear the veils.¹³ None of them attempt to understand the difficult situation faced by many girls in second-generation immigrant families, living ‘an exile within an exile’.¹⁴ Most surprising of all, ML contributors simply refuse to recognize the existence of an intense, exhausting, important, wide-ranging debate within French Muslims.¹⁵ They ignore works such as the superb *L'une voilée, l'autre pas* [one veiled, the other not], a well-written, well-researched analysis of the issue by two French Muslim women who, making use of the techniques of participant-observation, consider as wide a spectrum of opinion and experience as is possible.¹⁶ The controversial and iconoclastic Swiss-Muslim thinker Tariq Ramadam is simply hounded by ML’s contributors; any defence of the veil or of Muslim identity is immediately and unthinkingly dismissed as simple fundamentalism.

Not one of these twelve articles is prepared to consider that a woman might freely choose to veil herself, or that – in certain contexts – veiling might even play a liberating role. None of them consider the obvious and frequent role of the veil as passport: a device which allows the transition of young Muslim women from conservative (but *not* fundamentalist) homes into modern schools. None of them notes the frequent apparent paradox of young women who arrive from North Africa, where they had never worn a veil, and then choose to wear a veil, for the first time, once they arrive in France. This practice suggests the role of the veil as a form of self-assertion, a way of saying that young Muslim women want integration into the French Republic *without* assimilation.

Instead, the veil becomes a blank sheet upon which ML’s contributors re-

write a distinctly antique version of anarchist dogma. This argument is nicely demonstrated by the first point in a ten point programme concerning the *voile*.

1. The right to show one’s body.¹⁷

I’d happily support such a right, 100%, but only if it was accompanied by the declaration of an equal and contrary right: the right to cover one’s body. The significant point here is that while ML’s contributors can see the necessity of the first right, the idea that the second right might also be appropriate simply does not apply. One reason for this attitude probably lies in an older anarchist aesthetic, in which ‘the nude’ is presented as symbolic of a kind of natural freedom, or a voice of truth and – conversely – the covering of the nude as a form of repression.¹⁸ Once again, there is some validity in these ideas, but they clearly cannot be applied in this clumsy and ham-fisted manner.

Alongside this rather woolly aesthetic argument about bodily freedom, I can’t help wondering if there’s not a certain amount of good old-fashioned male lechery lurking in the columns of ML. On the one hand, ML does present an open platform for feminists and feminist arguments. On the other hand, reading through its issues one after another, it is impossible to ignore that almost every second issue contains a drawing or photo of a pretty young woman wearing not many clothes. Do these images set the cultural and aesthetic standards by which the *voilées* are being judged?

A CONSPIRACY

Only one anti-law article asked readers to listen to the ideas of the *voilées*. The majority of articles clearly refused to do this, merely referring to them as ‘manipulated’ or as ‘political pawns’, mere teenagers who consciously or unconsciously were acting as agents for fundamentalists.¹⁹ Referring to the sad case of the Turkish schoolgirl in Mulhouse who, in October 2004, shaved her head when her school refused to allow her entrance if she wore a veil, the ML commentator was contemptuous, considering that she spoke far too coherently to be genuine.²⁰ The master-minds behind this manipulation were often left anonymous, as is usually the case in such ‘moral panics’, but several ML writers point to the UOIF (the Union of French Islamic Organizations), which is referred to unproblematically as ‘fundamentalist’, with no discussion about what this confusing label might mean, and no evidence to explain why it was appropriate. Any activity by the UOIF in defence of *voilées* was immediately seen as manipulative and illegitimate by the majority of ML contributors. Once again, this was a strange argument: given the UOIF’s open and explicit opposition to the new law, it would have been odd if they did not aid school-girls facing state repression. To date, all the evidence suggests that UOIF is acting entirely within the structures of the French law. What is still more

strange is that the ML proposes no solidarity with the victims of state stigmatisation.

The same point led ML contributors to warn of the reality lurking behind this piece of cloth: behind the *voilées*, the fundamentalists and their violence against women, their sexual harassment of unveiled women in the housing estates, their polygamy, even their support for female genital mutilation – a familiar list of scare topics raised by every sundry Islamophobe across Europe, and which could have been cut-and-pasted from articles published in the right-wing *Figaro* or the trendy, soft-left *Libération*.²¹ While each of these topics is profoundly serious, they simply are not relevant to the debate on the veil in France. If there are organized fundamentalist forces attempting to police the presence of women on French streets, then action should be taken against *those forces*, not against their victims. Male sexual violence deserves to be fought wherever it occurs – but, as yet, there is little convincing evidence that Muslim men are more likely to be violent than non-Muslims. As for female genital mutilation: this is little more than slander. There is no Qur’anic support for the practice whatsoever. In some African countries it existed as practice *before* Islam, and it has never been proposed by Muslim authorities although, to the shame of those same authorities, it has been tolerated. The countries with the worst records of female genital mutilation are not Muslim.

ISLAM

While the majority of these articles were hostile to what they termed fundamentalism, it is clear that this was part of a more general attitude. An article from May 2005 was explicit: it called on ML to

... fight Islam. This theme might make us uneasy because, after all, there are other people, some of them highly reprehensible, who speak of fighting Islam. But we know that our reasons for fighting Islam are not racism or the desire to replace one disease of the mind with another.²²

This is interesting proposition. The ten thousand readers of the ML are being rallied to fight the world’s two billion Muslims. And, above all, there are no qualifications to this call: it ignores both Islam’s limited – but real – historical achievements and its potential to inspire aesthetic pleasure, scientific progress, social justice or human dignity. Muslim architecture, including the glories of the Alhambra in Granada, will have to be smashed. The delightful Arabo-Andalusian music, endlessly re-cycled in shaky videos by Moroccan television to aid elderly listeners with their afternoon siestas, will be banned. The Muslim scientific advances, which discovered algebra, identified alcohol and investigated alchemy, will be rejected by the new zealots of ML. Algerian *raï* music, unpopular with Muslim fundamentalists but still played by Muslim

musicians, would also be forbidden. Under this new enlightened rule, we will even have to return to the Roman arithmetic, and ML will now bear the date MMVI, for the modern European system of counting, with its all-important use of the zero, was copied from Muslim mathematicians. Even the future of chess and draughts looks a bit dodgy.

It is hard to know what is saddest in this situation. Can one imagine Voltaire crying ‘Fight Protestantism!’ during the Calas Case? Or Faure and Mirbeau calling on anarchists to ‘Fight Judaism!’ during the Dreyfus Affair? The writers of ML are suffering from a deep and pronounced intellectual exhaustion. One gets the impression that they would only feel some understanding of the *voilées* if the schoolgirls justified their choices by citing passages from Proudhon (which would not be completely impossible). The most basic points to be derived from religious sociology escape ML’s writers. Is it not blindingly obvious that a minority religion *deserves* a different treatment from that accorded to a majority religion, and that the civil liberties and respect given to minorities shape the real freedom enjoyed by the majority? Secondly, is it not also obvious that the development of new forms of Muslim faith are *symptoms* of other, deeper issues, rather than *causes* of problems? When Marx noted that religion is ‘the cry of the heart in a heartless world’ he was doing nothing less than calling for this type of sensitivity to the cultural and social role of religions. Lastly, it should never be forgotten that one impulse within Islam was an attempt to create a non-hierarchical religion. Of course, in practice this has largely failed, but this point alone should be enough to make anarchists interested in Islam.²³

Another way to make the same point is to ask that the ML consider Muslims not Islam; that they address themselves to the real experience of real people living in France and not draw nightmare comparisons from the quite different contexts of Iran or Bangladesh. There is no one single Islam: instead, within the structures of cultural globalization, with its ‘diasporic public spheres’, new forms of Islam are being devised to express some of the resentments and aspirations of the first post-colonial generation from the families of Arab migrants.²⁴ In a context in which American hegemony is being justified through the use of crude anti-Islamic slogans, in which the European far right is exploiting anti-Muslim sentiment and in which European governments are policing travel and migration with ever-increasing severity,²⁵ the first duty of anarchists is that of solidarity with the victims of this repressive wave and *not* half-embarrassed expressions of support for state repression.

CONCLUSION: ONE SIZE FITS ALL?

ML’s articles explicitly refer back to the universalism of the Enlightenment. Its contributors are against ‘l’ethno-différencialisme’²⁶ and for universalism. But the ML is proposing a very peculiar form of universalism: a form which is

based on uniquely French concepts of *laïcité*, a form which accepts western concepts of female dress codes, a form which integrates hostile and often stupidly prejudiced images of Muslims, a universalism which never seems to consider whether there might be something to be learnt *from* other cultures ... in sum, a universalism which looks like a narrow, national, blinkered French particularism.

NOTES

1. For an analysis of the work of these committees, see my 'Stasi's Republic: the school and the "veil"', December 2003-March 2004', *Modern and Contemporary France* 12:3 (2004), pp.387-97.
2. 'Les mots sont importants', or 'words are important'. <http://lmsi.net/>
3. Sylvain Pattieu, *Les camarades des frères: trotskistes et libertaires dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Syllepsie, 2002).
4. Nestor Potkine, 'Au tour de l'Islam, maintenant', ML, 26 mai 2005.
5. Octave Mirbeau, 'To a Proletarian' in Pierre Michel and Jean-François Nivet (eds), *L'Affaire Dreyfus* (Paris: Séguier, 1991), pp.74-80.
6. Jean-Claude Richard, 'Ecole et laïcité: le débat est loin d'être tranché', ML, 21 April 2005.
7. Georges Lecardinet, 'L'appel ... ou la voix des amis de Ramadan', ML, 28 April 2005.
8. Simon, 'La laïcité n'est pas l'athéisme', ML 2 June 2005. This argument is developed at greater length by Olivier Roy, *La laïcité face à l'Islam* (Paris: Stock, 2005).
9. Cathérine Deudon, Liliane Kaudel, Annie Sugier and Anne Zelensky, 'Les féministes se dévoilent', ML, 11 Dec 2003.
10. Roland Breton, 'Le port du voile est à replacer parmi les autres pratiques sexuelles', ML, 15 Jan 2004.
11. Johann, 'La religion opprime, l'Etat réprime', ML, 22 Jan 2004.
12. 'Le Furet', 'La nouvelle bataille du voile', ML, 4 Nov 2004.
13. In this respect, the ML's coverage was markedly inferior to that provided by the libertarian-minded web-site, Les mots sont importants. See its report 'L'interdiction du voile: qu'en pensent les élèves?', dated 14 Jan 2004.
14. Tahar Ben Jelloun, *Hospitalité française: racisme et immigration maghrébine* (Paris: Seuil, 1984), p.106.
15. This new wave of Muslim thinkers is analysed by Rachid Benzine, *Les nouveaux penseurs de l'Islam* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004). This work is not referred to in any of ML's articles.
16. D. Bouzar and S. Kada, *L'une voilée, l'autre pas* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2003).
17. Roland Breton, 'Le port du voile est à replacer parmi les autres pratiques sexuelles', ML, 15 Jan 2004.
18. On this point, see Richard Cleminson, 'Making Sense of the Body: Anarchism, Nudism and Subjective Experience', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* 81:6 (2004), pp.697-716.
19. 'La nouvelle bataille du voile', ML, 4 Nov 2004; 'Les féministes se dévoilent', ML, 11 déc 2003.
20. 'Le Furet', 'La nouvelle bataille du voile', ML, 4 Nov 2004.
21. Roland Breton, 'Le port du voile est à replacer parmi les autres pratiques sexuelles', ML, 15 Jan 2004.
22. Nestor Potkine, 'Au tour de l'Islam, maintenant', ML, 26 May 2005. One notes in passing the similarity between these ideas and those of Samuel Huntington: 'The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.' *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p.217.
23. On this point see Harold B. Barclay, 'Islam, Muslim Societies and Anarchy', *Anarchist Studies* 10:2 (2002), pp.105-18 and Patricia Crone, 'Ninth-Century Muslim Anarchists', *Past and Present* 167 (2000), pp.3-28. Another paradoxical similarity between anarchists and Muslims is suggested in Michael Collyer, 'Secret Agents: Anarchists, Islamists and responses to politically active refugees in London', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28:2 (2005), pp.278-303.
24. On cultural globalization: see Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1996), particularly pp.21-23.
25. On asylum policy, see Carl Levy, 'The European Union after 9/11: the Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime', *Government and Opposition* (2005), pp.26-59
26. Jean-Claude Richard, 'Le voile n'est pas soluble dans l'anarchisme', ML 27 Jan 2005.