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Gregor Gall
Left politics has traditionally been founded on internationalism, taking inspiration
from the historic appeal to workers of the world, regardless of country, to
unite together in common purpose. Here lies the source of the accusation wielded
by some on the left against others on the left in the post-war period that
giving any support to any independence movements on mainland Britain will
lead to a fundamental, irrevocable and unwelcome fracture to the working class.
The fear is that the unity of the working class movement in Britain will be
broken, leading to retreat and defeat as well as the end of the socialist
project.
Those on the left who support the right of the peoples of Scotland and Wales
to national self-determination are castigated as nationalists (and reactionaries)1
while those arguing against these nations’ self-determination are held
by the other side of the left to be unionists (and reactionary)2. Such a division
reflects of an age old schism amongst the left between the polarities of what
pass for understandings of nationalism and internationalism. It is easy to
establish consensus on each side of this left divide for opposition to narrow-minded,
competitive, exclusionary and divisive nationalism. It is not so easy to reach
any consensus across the divide on recognition of the potential for a progressive,
internationalist nation-based political project which would inevitably draw
upon elements that protagonists in the debate treat as opposites.
The internationalism that the self-styled ‘internationalist’ British
left - like the vocal Trotskyite left exemplified by the Socialist Workers’
Party or Socialist Party (formerly Militant) - subscribe to is the product
of an interpretation of internationalism as transnationalism and non-nationalism
where nations are regarded as insignificant and regressive units of social
identity. For example, Trotskyist historian Neil Davidson sees ‘the
radicalism of Scottish national identity as an alternative to or substitute
for genuine socialist internationalism’ [emphasis in original] and this
leads to the practical conclusions that the so-called nationalist left in
Scotland has ‘lazy and erroneous assumptions … [comprising] the
notions that Scotland is an oppressed nation, that Scottish workers are more
militant than their brothers and sisters south of the border, that an independent
Scotland would inevitably be left-wing and that independence would provoke
a crisis for the British ruling class’3.
But if internationalism is to be understood properly, it is a concept consisting
of relationships between nations in a social world where nationalities are
distinguished amongst and between themselves in order to reflect their cultures
and identities - these remaining vital and thriving sub-global units of social
organisation. For example, Tommy Sheridan has recently spoken of ‘internationalism
[comprising] ‘inter’ and ‘nationalism’ [as] a collective
of nationalisms’4. The modern phenomenon of nations is but the highest
level and most powerful form of identity and cleavage we have yet experienced.
The complexion of nation and nationalism reflect the outcomes of their internal
political processes under capitalism. It would seem reasonable to suggest
that these can be of different and varying complexions albeit within certain
limits. Certainly, Tommy Sheridan has proselytised for ‘another Scotland’
of peace, social justice and democracy. Historical examples would be Bolivarian
socialism, the Scandinavian model, Rhineland capitalism, Japanese state-sponsored
capitalism and deregulated Anglo-Saxon capitalism. It is the degree to which
there is choice about the complexion of these which is of interest here, varying
as it can do from social and participative democracy to neo-liberal capitalism,
because this choice holds out the prospect of both amelioration of the extremities
of capitalism in the present, and through the creation of consciousness and
capacity building, the complete reconfiguration of the capitalist state and
society in the future.
Britain and its labour movements
In any project of leftwing social transformation, the role of organised labour
as a mass body of workers is critical. So a salient question for this chapter
is: has Britain always had a labour movement in the singular, that is, has
there always been a British labour movement? These are important questions
for it is assumed by many left-wing critics that the ‘break-up’
of Britain would have wholly negative consequences for the labour movement
in Britain. Put bluntly, as it often is, the splitting the working class by
ending the unitary union would prevent the realisation of socialism in Britain.
When unions first developed in Britain, the vast majority were regional or
city-based reflecting the nature of labour markets at the time. It was only
later through merger and amalgamation because of the development of economic
integration and class consciousness that proto-national unions developed.
Thus, the creation of the ‘National Union of …’ from a standing
start was highly unusual. The example of the creation of the Transport and
General Workers’ Union in 1922 from fourteen existing unions, most of
whom had either a formal or actual regional character, is a case in point.
In the post-war period, there were still a considerable number of local and
Scotland-based unions in existence. Only since the 1980s, have we witnessed
the hegemony of British-wide unions within mainland Britain. Of course, this
should not detract from recognition of the close and intertwined association
of British-ness with the union movement. Much of this reflects the desire,
on the part of the labour movement, to act in a parallel manner to the state
and institutions of extant parliamentary democracy. For example, the Labour
Representation Committee was established in 1900 with the leadership of two
Scots (Ramsay MacDonald and Keir Hardie) who were based outside London.
Scottish left radicalism
Whilst left radicalism can be found elsewhere in Britain – at the levels
of nations, regions and cities – and Scotland as a socio-geographic
entity is not imbued with radicalism throughout, it is nonetheless the case
that Scotland has disproportionately sustained a large strain of radicalism.
This arises for two surface levels reasons, namely, the political domination
of Scotland by its Central Belt and the preference of most citizens of Scotland
to describe themselves as ‘Scottish’ rather than as ‘British’
or, more ‘Scottish’ than ‘British’5. Underlying these
are two far more important phenomena. The first is that the Central Belt has
seen the creation of and sustenance of ‘communities of collectivism’
based on networks imbued with radical political outlooks of social democracy
and socialism and manifested in unions, political parties and social campaigns
as well as the participation and mobilisation within these6. The second is
that Scottish national identity is characterised by, and has come to represent,
progressive social values over issues like wealth distribution, public services
and social welfare. Scottish-ness7 is itself predominantly defined by its
association with being working class, so much so that those working-class
Scots that become middle class by virtue of social mobility, through education
and employment, still invariably describe themselves as working-class because
of the cultural and social values this represents and which they hold dear.
The location of the majority of industry, commerce and government as well
as most of the population continues to be found in the east-west corridor
between Edinburgh and Glasgow known as the Central Belt. Within this, Glasgow
and the Greater Glasgow and Strathclyde areas have exercised again a disproportionate
influence. The concentration of economic, social and political activity has
facilitated the creation of social networks but not the nature of these networks.
The radical left traditions in the form of industrial mobilisations like ‘Red
Clydeside’8 of 1910-1932 and the UCS work-in9 of 1971-1972 as well as
political mobilisations such as the creation and development of the Scottish
Labour Party and Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)10 and greater development
of the Independent Labour Party and the Communist Party (CP) in Scotland are
important symbols and manifestations of a bigger subterranean culture of social
justice, fairness and inclusion. These networks provided the ideological basis
for subsequent mobilisations as well as defence of social-democratic values
and institutions.
Much, if not all, of this may seem only of historical, and not contemporary,
salience. Invoking the memory and spirit of these pasts cannot bring forth
their subsequent manifestations in the present. But three factors indicate
the continued vibrancy of these worldviews, even if they - like many other
radicalisms - are rather diminished by the continuing hegemony of neo-liberalism.
The desire for social democracy in the form of a distinctive sense of ‘Scottish
socialism’ is evidenced in i) the continued preference amongst many
Labour voters and members in Scotland for ‘old’ Labour-ism despite,
and because of, ‘new’ Labour, ii) the transformation of the SNP
from a tartan Tory party into a social democratic one, and iii) the emergence
of the SSP as a significant political force to the left of Labour. The desire
amongst Labour voters and members here centres round a desire to return to
state policies of full employment and a ‘cradle to grave’ welfare
state11 while the transformation of the Scottish National Party (SNP) is most
obvious in terms of its social policies (notwithstanding the domination of
its economic thinking by neo-liberalism)12. And while the SSP’s star
shone brightly for only a short space of time (1999-2007), the implosion through
self-induced fratricide does not suggest that such an appeal to radicalism
of a Scottish hue is not necessarily a one-off phenomenon. In other words,
the constituency that the SSP spoke to, and for, required a credible, united
left and in the absence of that decided to act against ‘new’ Labour
by transferring to the SNP. Whether such transferred allegiances become permanent
remains to be seen – indeed, this will depend on the inter-relationship
of the Scottish National, Labour and Scottish Socialist parties. Overall,
these three aforementioned developments are embedded in the progressive social
attitudes found in Scotland13 but they also are the manifestations of these
social attitudes, where political conclusions are drawn up about how to best
advance and realise these social attitudes.
Progressive national identity in Scotland has its deepest socio-cultural roots
in the development of the view (and actuality) of education as the means available
to working class children to access better life-chances within a social system
of post-education meritocracy. But it also has its political roots in the
social democratic belief of using the state to redistribute wealth through
taxation in order to provide the schools (and other parts of the welfare state).
Consequently, the spirit of individualism, entrepreneurship and the market
were not well embedded in the popular psyche in Scotland. The manifestation
of this was found in a political ‘low’ culture epitomized by the
popular Scottish egalitarian saying, ‘We’re all Jock Tamson’s
bairns [children]’ meaning that the mass of Scottish people are working
class and experience this en masse as one class. In a more political sense,
this belief was found in the domination of working class consciousness by
the Labour Party as the ‘people’s party’ and the place of
unions and Labour as the two, closely connected, wings of the working class
movement.
An aspect which highlights this is the profound influence of the Communist
Party until the early 1990s. Operating through a political programme –
ironically The British Road to Socialism – which focused on the role
of winning the Labour Party to a left-wing programme with which to legislate
for socialism and relating to industrial struggles and Scottish radicalism
through support for devolution (known then as home rule), the CP achieved
a significant degree of penetration into Scottish political life. On a lesser
scale but highlighting the same tendencies and dynamics is the contrast between
the greater implantation of the Militant (and then Scottish Militant Labour)
and lesser SWP implantation into Scottish political life. Operating through
Labour, Militant was first able to present itself as ‘true’ or
‘proper’ Labour against the dominant rightwing leadership in Scotland,
organise in communities against the poll tax, giving it the leadership of
the anti-poll tax movement, and then relate to the notions of Scottish working
class radicalism through their ‘Scottish turn’ of 1991. By contrast,
the SWP remained far more isolated and small in numbers and influence throughout
these periods as a result of its anti-Labourism and transnationalism.
Comparison with Wales also clarifies the process of explaining this Scottish
left radicalism further. The parallels with Wales are many in terms of the
merging of radicalism and national identity and the leading role of a particular
area with Wales (i.e. south Wales). But the relative underdevelopment of national
identity in Wales, its smaller population size and the lesser impact of native
developments on the body politic in Britain highlight the ways in which the
process of merging has been less pronounced and has had less purchase on popular
psyche (despite union density and strike propensity being higher in Wales
than in Scotland). In this regard, the regional identities of Merseyside,
north-east England or London are poorer relations still.
Devolution and the dented shield
Scottish national identity has seldom been of a competitive or reactionary
nature. Its progressive traits became more pervasive and persuasive in the
post-1979 period. No matter what organisational form it was expressed through
– whether the Scottish Labour, CP, Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC),
SNP or a host of ad hoc bodies like the poll tax campaign, the short lived
post-1992 election anti-Tory alliance called Scotland United or the Constitutional
Convention which aggregated the forces that delivered a devolved settlement
- Scottish national identity as a social democratic creed increasingly became
the basis of asserting that Thatcherism was alien, unwelcome and unjust. It
was not that considerations of class were irrelevant here. Rather, and far
from it, the working class was - through its historical representatives –
the embodiment of these Scottish social values and aspirations. The more politically
advanced working class, a socialised market through state intervention and
what it meant to be Scottish were but three sides of the self-same triangle.
And so given the palpable failure of the labour movement and Labour Party
to defeat Thatcherism and the Tories in either industrial or political battles
on a British-wide basis throughout the 1980s, the sense in which devolution
became the dented shield by which to try to defend these different political
worldview grew. Both the CP and the STUC14 had favoured devolution prior to
1979 but Labour’s shift to supporting the cause was the tipping point
in giving the movement the necessary social and political weight. Previously,
Labour had been heavily split on the issue with some of the left within it
basing its opposition on criticism of nationalism and with others on the Labour
left supporting it based on their desire for greater democracy and building
an alliance against Thatcherism and the Tories (who opposed devolution). For
Labour, the motivation for then supporting devolution was two-fold. First,
to further undermine the Conservatives and gain the Westminster seats necessary
to deliver a Labour government. Second, as a tactical move to attempt to derail
the SNP and the forces for independence - in the increasingly over time infamous
words of then Labour MP and Shadow Secretary for Scotland, George Robertson
(subsequently NATO general secretary and Lord), in 1998: ’Devolution
will kill nationalism [ie the SNP] stone dead’.
Nonetheless, the strategy of the dented shield of trying to establish means
of limiting and ameliorating the impact of Thatcherism was the same one fought
out by Labour councils north and south of the border. In England, it was fought
through the battle against rate capping (especially in Liverpool, Lambeth
and Sheffield) and against the abolition of the GLC in London. But in Scotland,
it was expressed through national identity and aspirations towards devolution.
The connections between the dented shield, the aspirations of national identity
and devolution, on the one hand, and Labour, on the other, were immeasurably
strengthened by the response from the SNP. The SNP’s ‘independence
or nothing’ approach led it to absent itself from the Constitutional
Convention and allowed Labour to cement itself until 1997 as the primary force
for devolution. This was why Donald Dewar, Labour leader in Scotland and then
the first First Minster, was beatified as the ‘father of the nation’
who was responsible for representing the ‘settled will of the Scottish
people’. This merely reinforces the significance of the election of
an SNP government in 2007 all the more so.
Yet, the affect of the process of voting for devolution in 1997 and then its
implementation from 1999 onwards has made relatively little impact on trade
unionism per se in Scotland. This was partly because of the nature of the
settlement vis-à-vis what issues and responsibilities were devolved;
health, education and transport, and those that were (still) reserved for
Westminster; taxation, defence, and employment. In this sense, devolution
has had no specific bearing on industrial relations and collective bargaining
issues in Scotland (other than in the education and local government where
there were already separate bargaining structures prior to devolution, Scottish
government have more leeway to act independently as they see fit). But it
also arose because of the political strategy of Labour which governed between
1999 and 2007 to act in a largely ‘new’ Labour manner within the
confines of the settlement. For example, the unwillingness to exercise the
right to vary the level of taxation by three pence in the pound (above or
below current levels) meant that ‘new’ Labour, and thus Scotland,
were operating within the funding formulae called the Barnett Formulae which
determined how much money Westminster gave to Holyrood for public expenditure.
And, ‘new’ Labour, along with the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives,
believed - until 2007 with the election of an SNP government - that devolution
as constituted was the final judgement of the Scottish people on the matter.
The consequence of this has been that although differences emerged in social
welfare policy between Scotland and England, these were still relatively minor
differences15. In other words, the trajectory of Scotland here – until
2007 at least - was a variation on a theme rather than a sharp break with
the past and present of Britain.
However, where devolution has made a more significant difference has been
with regard to the role of the STUC and the electoral success, even if only
temporarily, of a small left party to the left of Labour, namely, the SSP.
The STUC has become a social partner within the body politic, albeit as a
pale reflection of the corporatism practiced in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s,
or that still practiced in many continental European countries. In 2002, it
signed a concordat agreement with the Scottish government to become a partner
in terms of the information and consultation over a wide series of measures
concerned with the economy, public services, social policy, immigration and
education. While such social dialogue did not amount to negotiation or bargaining,
it did cement and extent the STUC’s position as an important social
actor which finds no parallel in England. In England and cross-Britain terms,
the TUC plays the role of the peak federation for unions on a narrower range
of more economic issues. Sure, it has tried to widen its role but it has made
to manifest headway here as it has been rebuffed by ‘new’ Labour
governments enamored to the business lobby.
The SSP showed between 2003 and 2007, when it followed Tommy Sheridan’s
election to the Scottish Parliament in 1999 with a further 5 MSPs elected
in 2003, that a popular and more militant fusion of traditional left radicalism
and national identity was possible16. The SSP’s slogans of ‘struggle,
solidarity and socialism’ and ‘socialism, independence and internationalism’
were given a level of vindication, profile and legitimacy by the 2003 election
result. This was in turn used to promote the SSP in its own words as ‘Scotland’s
socialist party that stands for the transformation of society … fight[ing]
to replace capitalism with socialism [and] an economic system based on social
need and environmental protection rather than private profit and ecological
destruction’ through anti-war, anti-nuclear and union struggles. The
nursery nurses’ strike in 2004 was a case in point. By comparison, all
mainstream political parties equivocated in their support for the striker.
Tommy Sheridan's method, and that of the SSP in general, was to be able to
speak to wider milieus of people than had hitherto been possible by using
the conception of Scottish society to convey radical and socialist ideas.
Sheridan argued for ‘another Scotland’ and a distinctive version
of the ‘new Scotland’ which comprised a vision of Scotland of
peace (no nuclear weapons, no part in imperialist ventures), democracy (republicanism,
independence), social compassion (redistribution of wealth, full employment,
better public services) and a socialised economy (reduction in the role of
the free market through state intervention). This gave the SSP a cutting edge
in the flux of politics in Scotland when each political party of the centre
or soft left was attempting to claim hegemony for its political platform under
the early stages of devolution. Thus ‘another Scotland’ and the
distinctive version of the ‘new Scotland’ fused together the politics
of the SSP with the progressive and class-based aspirations embodied in the
dominant version of Scottish national identity. This perspective, developed
and expounded by the SSP’s chief theoretician Alan McCombes, provided
a more productive connection to workers and those of a progressive bent than
appeals to straight class instincts or the abstract and ultra-left ultimatums
to ‘stand up for socialism’ in an era of vastly reduced working
class consciousness. The classic text of this perspective is Imagine: a socialist
vision for the 21st century, written by McCombes but with Sheridan named as
its lead author. Tellingly, it spoke of an outward purpose of internal change
within Scotland, especially the aspiration of a Scottish socialist republic
as a part of a global struggle against capitalism and as a potential aid and
inspiration to those fighting the same battle elsewhere in the world (see
below).
Just as importantly the SSP carried forward the banner of Scottish socialism
that predated it by over a hundred years17. The consequences of the SSP’s
position and influence did not led it or others to call for the break-up of
British-wide collective bargaining structures in the health service or fire
service, for example, nor the break-up of British-wide unions18. This was
because the political basis of the SSP was still predicated on the cooperation
(and not competition) between workers with militant means for militant ends.
If there was any specific Scottish impact to the Scottish socialism perspective,
it was to lead most trade unions to cede slightly more autonomy to their Scottish
regions within their Britain-wide structures and to prefix or suffix their
organisation in Scotland with ‘Scottish’ or ‘Scotland’.
Two points concerning orientation are worth dwelling upon here. The appeal
to what it meant to be ‘Scottish’ – that is the most noble,
humanitarian, egalitarian and compassionate values contained therein –
was one that did not require that citizens were white and/or born in Scotland.
It was to an inclusive appeal to anyone who lived within Scotland to enjoin
in a political project to realise these values in the form of manifest social
outcomes. So it was about determining what Scottish society or society in
Scotland was to be like and not an appeal to what is inherently a much narrower
phenomenon of Scottish nationalism, where issues of constitutional and political
status take precedence over social concerns. The second point is that this
appeal was predicated on what can best be termed ‘Scottish internationalism’,
whereby political, financial and moral support is given to a number of causes
and campaigns outwith the shores of Scotland which embody the aspirations
of social progress whether contained within nation-states like Cuba and Venezuela,
aspirant nation-states like Palestine or necessarily global projects which
are not founded on single nation-states like protection of the environment
or unilateral nuclear disarmament.
But despite these developments in praxis, and too pre-occupied with the ramifications
of political advances and then internal disputes, the SSP did not make any
headway in developing theory or practice in regard of whether its version
of Scottish socialism - as a de facto form of social democracy rather than
socialism – was of a transitional capacity towards socialism. Without
this, its social democracy appeared as a self-limiting end in itself, and
certainly that was part of its appeal to an ‘old’ Labour constituency.
Contemporary Scottish social democracy
The 2007 election of a minority SNP government in Scotland marked another
key staging post in the decline of Labour in Scotland. The election of subsequent
Labour leaders after the resignation of party leader in Scotland, Jack McConnell,
did not indicate that Labour was seeking to attempt to reconnect with its
core supporters by reclaiming its social democratic mantle by moving to the
left. Rather, Blairite and Brownite ‘new’ Labour politics continued.
In social policy terms, the SNP has effectively replaced Labour as the predominant
social democratic party in Scotland even if that version of social democracy
sits uneasily with its somewhat neo-liberal economic policies19. The extension
of free school meals and reduction in prescription charges exist at the same
time as pro-business investment policies, over business rates, Donald Trump
and Brian Souter, for example. And, the SNP need not worry any time soon of
being outflanked for a chunk of the electorate’s support by either a
revived SSP or a revived Solidarity (led by Tommy Sheridan). Whilst the SNP
government has presided over school closures and the like, it is still given
the benefit of the doubt, especially when British Labour is presiding helplessly
over a massive recession it helped create through its neo-liberalism. The
only sign of any social democratic stirrings within Labour occur when it occasionally
and opportunistically attacks the SNP for not being left-wing enough20 - a
feat only made possible by the freedom of opposition and rich in irony given
its record in office between 1999 and 2007 in Scotland, and the rest of Britain
too. The Glenrothes by-election saw Labour halt the SNP bandwagon by attacking
it over cutting personal care services within Fife council.
The vast bulk of the Scottish union movement remains formally opposed to independence,
and the majority of the largest STUC affiliates maintain their affiliation
to Labour. There is no immediate prospect of a union affiliating to the SNP.
Yet, the relationship between the union movement and the SNP government remains
a fluid one. Prior to the May 2007 election, the STUC at its 2007 congress
took the unusual and contentious step in calling for a vote for Labour. This
was unusual in that it had never before made such an electoral intervention
but contentious in that there was widespread opposition to making such an
intervention from a considerable number of affiliates because of widespread
dissatisfaction with Labour. The STUC was dismayed when Labour lost but has
learnt over time to be pragmatic. It sees any opportunities for influence
as they are rather than refusing to recognise and deal with the new government
because it is an SNP government. For example, it welcomed Salmond’s
speech to its 2008 congress where he outline the commitment to build the first,
new, non-PFI, publicly funded hospital in Scotland. There have been some reasonably
pleasant surprises whenever the SNP has acted on its social democratic impulse
on issues such as school meals, prescription charges and student finance.
On other issues such as local government workers’ pay, conflict has
continued no matter which party is in government as it did over the maintenance
of Scotrail in the private sector. If a score card is constructed, the SNP
has done quite well on the agenda of serving workers as citizens but less
well on issues concerning serving workers as workers. Of course, it is more
able to more progress on the former than the latter given the devolution settlement.
In its early days, it has still done enough to prevent Labour and its affiliated
unions from being able to translate opportunistic attacks into deep-seated
body blows. However, much of the underlying rationale of SNP government policy
has been to build support for independence by showing that it is a competent
and sensible party in government. This will be a harder task if the SNP government
shows that it is not able to protect citizens in Scotland from the effects
of a recession without some good mitigating reason.
Future forms of union organisation
In addition to the small, now unorganised left in the SNP21, part of the left
in Scotland in and around the SSP, Solidarity and the Communist Party of Scotland
(CPS) has embraced the cause of independence. Each of these tendencies has
slightly different reasons in terms of aspirations and expected outcomes.
For example, some believe in the possibility of more easily contesting the
social nature of society under a ‘new’ Scotland because the conservative
influence of British-based agendas will be reduced. Others view the subsequent
enhancement of democracy in more narrow, political and constitutional terms
with regard to ‘Scotland’s place in the world’ as they see
it. While these minor parties’ members are disproportionately influential
as activists in Scotland’s union movement, the majority of the labour
movement at the level of formal policy, employed and lay officials, remains
committed to the a unitary state within Britain, with some minor differences
vis-à-vis powers within a devolved settlement.
The future schism over independence that may occur is more likely to be because
a growing number of ordinary unions’ members are attracted to the cause
of independence while their leadership remains implacably opposed. So subject
to the impact of a recession reducing room for SNP government action because
of financial constraints, the wider environment for such a dispute would be
a Scottish SNP government carrying forward a social democratic social policies
in contrast to the disappointments of Blair and Brown while Labour, backed
and funded by the unions, attempted a rearguard action against the SNP’s
plans for independence. Any limited desire amongst the union hierarchies for
independence would seek to be crushed by the British Labour leadership. Indeed,
in a parallel to the devolution process, one could foresee a situation where
then the case for independence will not only increase in force but take on
a greater left and progressive complexion for union activists under two further
conditions. First, a recession without seeming end under an adrift Labour
Westminster government where a rediscovery of neo-Keynesian state action is
too little too late, is used to indemnify the banks for their reckless past
practices and merely reinforces the distortion of an economy predicated on
a private housing market and financialisation. Second, the prospect of a Cameron
Tory government intent upon cuts in both tax and the public sector. A rearguard
action by the present Scottish Labour Party to offer ‘Scottish solutions
to Scottish problems’ would not be enough to retain support so long
as it remained within the confines of the structure and ideology of the British
Labour Party.
The position of the STUC will become incredibly fraught under such a process
and the only unions with the latitude to either support, or even be agnostic
about, independence would be those which are not affiliated to Labour such
as the leftwing FBU, PCS and RMT, and the EIS teaching union. This conflict
matters not just in terms of issues of representation and democracy within
unions but also because the sentiment to support independence is rooted in
a belief that an independence settlement in Scotland can afford the opportunity
for greater social justice and greater control over politics and economics
in society. This worldview would thus support – as does the predominant
strain of Scottish national identity – a social democratic rather than
neo-liberal settlement. As such, this would cause strains with both major
parts of Labour and the SNP for it would go further than most of its members
may want. It could also witness the foundation and development of a new united
socialist force or the SNP feeling compelled to move to the left in order
to realise its goal of independence. Here, the Scandanvian model rather than
the Irish or Icelandic one would be in the ascendance. And, of course, the
left in the SNP may refound itself as a larger and more coherent force (aided
and abetted by new recruits from without the SNP).
Yet if unions in Scotland are to become convinced of the merits of the case
for independence, then the social democratic opportunity that independence
provides needs to outlined and popularised22. But to win this new configuration
of pro-independence forces against the neo-liberal and business forces backing
their version of independence requires a union movement capable of making
such a case. It would take the left of the SNP and the SNP’s Trade Union
Group to play a far greater role in union politics as well as the hard left
forces of the SSP, Solidarity and CPS to win out over those of the Labour
left (Campaign for Socialism), SWP, International Socialists (Socialist Party)
and so on in the battle for the hearts, minds and actions of the silent, passive
and disengaged majority of union members. The continued depleted forces of
the SSP and Solidarity do not augur well for this task. But if such an outcome
could be achieved, it would help move the majority of independence supporters
to the left, making the social, rather than simply the constitutional, case
for independence. Such an eventuality of unions supporting and campaigning
for independence would, of course, create considerable tensions within all-Britain
unions.
In this future battle, the objections against independence with unions will
be required to be show as unfounded, based erroneously on reasons which revolve
around the fetishisation of various aspects of structures and dogma. First,
those of a labourist persuasion believe mistakenly in abstract notions of
working class unity that supposedly determine the effectiveness of unions
à la ‘unity is strength’. So the standard accusation that
independence will split the unity of the working class is preposterous when
that unity cannot be demonstrated to either exist in any meaningful, manifest
sense or to be capable of delivering effective outcomes. Rather, it is the
willingness to collectively mobilise (with the requisite strategic and tactical
deftness) to pursue interest representation which determines efficacy. So
it is not the united action of miners in a previous age or postal workers
or civil servants today north and south of the border which determines its
strength. It is the action itself and there is no reason to suppose that postal
workers in England fighting their separate (English) Post Office employer
would be any less effective if their Scottish counterparts were not fighting
with them. Furthermore, there is no reason to suspect why workers of one employer
north and south of the border would not want to fight together against their
same employer (see below).
Second, a fairly convincing case can be made that the labourist political
tradition within the union movement has been a block on such effective mobilisation
because of the division of economics (dealt with by unions) from politics
(dealt with by the Labour Party) and the considerable influence of the Labour
Party in urging union moderation in the economic field for fear of unions
making Labour politically unelectable. Aspirations of relations of unity must
allow for the building of strength for unity in strength is only manifest
if based on action (not inaction) and on activity (not passivity). The cases
of the industrially militant but political party unaffiliated RMT and PCS
unions since the early 2000s highlight that the relatively more unconstrained
environment they have constructed for themselves. And the RMT itself has shown
that effective industrial militancy under company-level bargaining –
that, is amongst Scotrail and the plethora or other rail operators in England
– has been achievable.
Third, and in a different way, organisational structures do not determine
efficacy. In a globalised era, and notwithstanding that unions still need
to develop levers over nation-based states because those states are still
powerful actors, the actions of nation-based unions require some reconfiguration
in order to act against transnational players, whether these be employers
or supra-state agencies. In this era and in this sense, whether unions are
Scottish- or British-based is not the salient issue for what has now become
salient is how these unions mobilise in concert with sister unions elsewhere
in Europe or North America to effectively bargain with employers and regulatory
regimes which operate across national borders.
Fourth, dealing with employers which operate north and south of the border
of an independent Scotland will require unity in collective action between
different unions and amongst different workers. Workers in a separate Scotland
would not necessarily need to be in separate unions from their brothers and
sisters in England or Wales for, as with Ireland, workers can be in the same
union which organises workers in a set of companies within a sector and which
operate across the British Isles. Lastly, the growth of ‘super-unions’
in Britain has not made a strong case for the organisational aggregation of
union members in a small number of very large, cross-Britain conglomerate
unions being more effective than their dispersion amongst a larger number
of smaller unions. This again suggests the abstracted notion of unity in the
form of organizational structure has again, unfortunately, become totemic.
And, under such super-unions, membership participation and control are harder
to facilitate as is the representation of legitimate sectional interests.
So the crux of the matter for unions is to develop practices and structures
which are both more participative and democratic as well as effective in collective
interest representation. The RMT is a good example here. But more generally,
the forms of organisation this could take would autonomous regions for Scotland
within existing Britain-wide unions or even separate unions in Scotland which
work with others unions wherever they be. Either way, unions need to develop
levers of power to wield against the various actors which operate in different
arenas and at different levels. The one certainty is that collective grassroots
mobilisation of a genine transnational (sic) nature will be become a pre-requisite
for effective unions.
Endpoint
The tight boundaries of neo-liberalist thought and action of the Brown Labour
government became much starker during the severe recession of 2008 onwards.
Bank bailouts mitigated the impact of the banks’ action on themselves
rather than the population as a whole. State intervention was predicated on
saving the ‘free market’. And although the Tories have receded
somewhat from their earlier rampant recovery under Cameron in 2007, Labour’s
electoral base – both working class and middle class - still seems set
to continue to erode. This means that the prospect of a Conservative government
at Westminster by no later than mid-2010 is still a serious one. If so, the
SNP’s case for independence will be considerably strengthened for it
will be able to present independence not as the dented shield of protection
but rather the act of striking out and away on its own from the forces of
reaction and inequality. Herein lies an opportunity for the left to contest
the present complexion of an independence settlement in order to ensure that
the colouration is, at least, social democratic. Fusion of progressive and
class-based aspirations embodied in the Scottish national identity provides
means to both determine the existence and terms of independence. But the small
matter of the implosion of Scottish socialism in the guise of the SSP since
2007 casts a dark cloud over the chances of this new beginning. Without it
and fellow travelers in significant numbers, it is difficult to see how a
bigger cog of citizenship can be turned in order to assure society in Scotland
of a new, socially just settlement.
1. See, for example,
the characterisations in politics of the Socialist Workers’ Party and
Socialist Party as represented by respectively Neil Davidson ‘Socialists
and Scottish independence’ International Socialism, No. 114, 2007, pp33-50
and ‘Is there a Scottish road to socialism?’ in Gregor Gall (ed.)
Is there a Scottish road to socialism?, Scottish Left Review Press,
2007, pp118-128, and The Socialist (3 April 2004, 12 February 2005)
and ‘Which way now for the SSP’ (November 2005) available at http://www.cwiscotland.org
.
2. See, for example, the characterisations in the writings of Kevin Williamson
(see http://www.kevinwilliamson.blogspot.com and the Scottish Socialist Republican
Movement (see http://www.srsm.net/index.html
).
3. Neil Davidson, ‘Scotland: almost afraid to know itself?’
International Socialism, No. 109, 2006, pp179-181, and Iain Ferguson,
‘Revamping old formulas’ International Socialism, No.
115, 2007, pp215-216.
4. At a public meeting of Solidarity, the party of which Sheridan is co-convenor,
in Glasgow during the Glasgow East by-election campaign, July 2008.
5. See Gregor Gall, The Political Economy of Scotland: Red Scotland? Radical
Scotland?, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2005m chapter 6, Michael
Rosie and Ross Bond ‘Routes into Scottishness’ in Catherine Bromely,
John Curtice, David McCrone and Alison Park (eds.) Has Devolution Delivered?,
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, chapter 9 and Michael Rosie and Ross
Bond ‘National identities and politics after devolution’, Radical
Statistics, No. 97, 2008, pp47-65.
6. See Gall, The Political Economy of Scotland, chapters 4 and 6.
7. Of course, there are other versions of Scottish-ness such as the Sir Walter
Scott or ‘tartan and shortbread’ view which is a conservative
construction of a rural idyll of the past imbued with social deference. But
the point here is these are very much minority views without much popular
purchase.
8. See http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/redclyde/
9. See http://www.gcal.ac.uk/radicalglasgow/chapters/ucs_workin.html
10. Both the current SLP and SSP had predecessors (two each) of the same names
which indicate a longer historical thread of radicalism (see search of wikipedia).
11. See Gerry Hassan (ed.) The Scottish Labour Party: history, institutions
and ideas, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004.
12. Peter
Lynch, SNP – a history of the Scottish National Party, Welsh
Academic Press, Cardiff, 2002.
13. See Gall, The Political Economy of Scotland.
14. The
support of the CP and STUC for devolution arose from the CP’s strategy
to build a broad populist, democratic alliance against monopoly capitalism.
The CP and its allies on the Labour left dominated the STUC and its affiliates
in the 1970s and 1980s.
15. For example, free personal health care for the elderly, better student
funding and the slowing down of the use of PFI projects are examples of a
number of instances of Scottish divergence. What they represented was a blunting
of neo-liberalism advance not its rejection, halting or overthrowing. And,
in comparison to development in Wales with less powers and financial capacity,
these initiatives do not look quite as good as many made out.
16. SSP membership reached a peak of some 3,000 in 2003. However, a fratricidal
feud over Sheridan’s choice to take News of the World to court over
allegations about his private life led primarily to an electoral wipe out
in 2007 for both the SSP and Sheridan’s new political party, Solidarity.
In the conditions of a split and ensuing demoralisation and disillusionement,
SSP membership fell to c1,000 by 2008.
17. See Gall, The Political Economy of Scotland, chapters 4 and 6.
18. Indeed, the only Scottish union to be set up in this period, the Scottish
Artists’ Union, was founded on the basis of relating to the source of
government funding and policy for the arts coming from Holyrood and not Westminster.
19. In an interview with the Total Politics magazine (September 2008),
Salmond stated: ‘The SNP has a strong social conscience, which is very
Scottish in itself. One of the reasons Scotland didn't take to Lady Thatcher
was because of that. We didn't mind the economic side so much. But we didn't
like the social side at all.’ In the SNP’s advocacy of Scotland
under independence being able to fit into an ‘arc of prosperity’
of small nations, it is interesting to note that this relied more on the Irish
and Icelandic systems of neo-liberalist deregulation rather than the social
democracy of the Scandinavian countries like Sweden, Finland and Denmark.
Norway, with its oil reserves, was the one exception here.
20. See Unite press releases, 14 September 2008
(http://www.unitethelabourunion.org.uk/news-article.php?iNewsId=790)
and 29 January 2009 (http://www.amicustheunion.org/Default.aspx?page=9958
).
21. The ’79 Group and some of those that formed the Scottish Labour
Party represented the left of the SNP. The last time the left in the SNP was
organised (in the 1980s) was around the journal, Radical Scotland.
Many of those involved in it are now leading lights in the SNP leadership.
22. Gall, G. ‘Scottish independence and the trade labour union movement
in Scotland’ Scottish Workers’ Republic, No. 5, December
2004, pp10-11.
Biographical note
Gregor Gall is Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Hertfordshire
and a regular contributor to the Morning Star and the Guardian’s
CommentisFree. He was previously Professor of Industrial Relations
at the University of Stirling and lives in Edinburgh. He is an editorial board
member of the Scottish Left Review, editor of the Scottish Left Review
Press, and chair of the editorial committee of Scottish Labour History,
the journal of the Scottish Labour History Society. He is a member of the
Scottish Socialist Party. Among his books are: The Meaning of Militancy?
Postal workers and industrial relations (Ashgate, 2003), Sex Worker
Union Organising: an international study (Palgrave, 2006), Labour
Unionism in the Financial Services Sector: fighting for rights and representation
(Ashgate, 2008) and four edited volumes on union organising (Routledge and
Palgrave).